From the diary of Major George Miller, US Army, attached to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
9AM, 7th June (D+1)
I overslept this morning – not surprising with the frantic pace of yesterday. Though when I say overslept, it was not long after daybreak. Even with English summertime it was not long after 7AM. Maybe the cloudy skies caused me to sleep in. Not a good omen for D-2: our aircraft will be a lot less effective. Still, Southwick House was bustling by the time I arrived, phones ringing, motor-cycle couriers running around like madmen, worried looking adjutants everywhere. And more stars, epaulettes and ribbons than you could imagine.
Probably the most sombre looking was Admiral Ramsay[1]. Yesterday’s naval losses have been confirmed. The Royal Navy suffered the worst. Two battleships and no less than seven light cruisers are out of action for the foreseeable future. Add to that seven destroyers and three destroyer escorts and it is clear the British have paid a heavy price for supplying most of the naval support. But the US Navy also lost two cruisers and a destroyer, the French a destroyer and the Polish an escort. About the only positive news for the navy, apart from the gratitude of the army commanders for the support of their big guns, was that the transfer of the entire fleet off the coast of Utah to the coast of Omaha was carried out without loss. It has been, according to those who were present overnight, a nerve-wracking time for Ramsay. Admiral Kirk[2] was aboard the “Augusta”, leading his ships through the minefields, alert for e-boats and submarines, every flak gun on the watch. He had plenty to do: all Ramsay could do was wait.
Western Task Force fires its anti-aircraft guns: were there any enemy bombers present?
Had General Bradley[3] been there, I think he would have looked more upset than Ramsay. He is apparently in discussions with Gerow[4], as the information from Omaha is not good. The queue to get a landing spot is growing, even though the beach controllers are doing their best to get men and vehicles off the beach as quickly as possible. It is just that the Germans have now built a perimeter around the bridgehead and it is getting harder to break out. Gerhardt[5] reported that an attempt by Colonel Canham[6] to take Colleville sur Mer overnight failed with heavy losses.
Omaha: during the night more German units moved up to further restrict the beachhead.
Utah would not be troubling Bradley much: Collins[7] is making up for the initial delays and claims he will have the entire 4th Infantry ashore by the end of the day. There Germans seem still shocked: at least they did not make any attacks overnight though we must assume that reinforcements are moving up. With St Mère Église in the hands of 101st Airborne Division, Taylor[8] assured Ridgway[9] that he had his back. As a result, 82nd Airborne has tightened its grip on Picauville, where we are now sure we have surrounded the headquarters of the German 91.Infanterie-Division.
All the British beaches expanded overnight, to varying degrees. Unfortunately the Germans have created a barrier to movement to the west, and although General Dempsey[10] has ordered XXX Corps to make linking up with the US VII Corps a priority, little progress has been made. 50th Division has been given enough vehicles to motorise all its units, but Graham[11] cannot yet muster the strength to make a breakout towards the beleaguered Americans.
Advances inland were made during the hours of darkness, with about half a dozen successful night attacks between Asnelles and the Canal de Caen. Troops are streaming ashore and all the indications are that today will see a concerted push towards Caen.
After one day, only the Commonwealth landings are going according to plan
The only cloud on the horizon comes from Gale[12] on the eastern side of the Orne River. He is coming under increasing pressure, with a large German force moving through the Bois de Bavent. Failure to destroy all the bridges across the Dives River has allowed the enemy to bring up more troops from the east. The armoured unit to the south, now confirmed as 21.Panzer-Division, is far too strong for the lightly armed paratroopers. As it is, nothing has been heard from the unit holding Cuverville[13], and it must be assumed to have been lost.
Pionere armed with the Flammenwerfer 41 attack Cuverville
With the problems at Omaha, plans have been altered. Obviously I was not au fait with all the details of the original strategy, but it is was fairly clear from the logistical demands what had been intended. The British were to take Caen within a day or two of landing and then to drive east, using the Bénouville bridge to threaten the German flank while they headed southwest towards Falaise and Argences. V Corps had been meant to push from Omaha to Bayeux while also co-operating with the airborne troops on the Cotentin to join up at Carentan. Meanwhile, VII Corps would concentrate on moving north, its objective being the major port at Cherbourg.
All this is now in the air. In a funny way, that is how I can see what is being planned. I don’t get to sit in on military discussions, but the orders to the air groups created a bit of a row, and they show the change in objectives. Everything is now to be concentrated on breaking the ring around V Corps and some of the air commanders were less than enthusiastic at changing their plans. Leigh-Mallory[14] only has command of RAF Second Tactical Airforce and the US 9th Air Force and even they are supposed to be dedicated to supporting their own armies. From what I hear, Eisenhower intervened personally and made it clear he would tolerate no objections. (My sources tell me he is concerned at the lack of co-operation and will move to place RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th Airforce directly under SHAEF to make sure no more problems arise. And that Leigh-Mallory is being watched: neither Eisenhower nor Montgomery were impressed by his performance.)
Air-Chief Marshall Leigh Mallory addresses air crews to stress the importance of their new missions
Medium bombers are to harry the reinforcements moving up, but not on the Cotentin peninsula, only to the south. All fighter bombers and attack bombers other than a few assigned to the surviving Dives bridges are reserved to carry out operations to seal off Omaha or support the ground troops as they break out of the perimeter. More than 60% of all supplies will be sent to the west, the British having to make do with the remainder.
I would have thought Montgomery would be unhappy, but a couple of people told me he did not express any annoyance that the Commonwealth divisions would have to change their plans to assist the Americans. Not that he showed anyway. He might be keen to get his own soldiers into Paris first, but he is no fool. If Omaha collapses, or if the Americans cannot land enough troops to tie up the Germans moving from the south of France, then the invasion will stall.
So the focus for today will be on Omaha. Gerow will have all the naval and air support that Eisenhower can provide but at the end of the day it is up to his two divisions to break the German perimeter. Collins has been told to forget Cherbourg for now and to help the 101st take Carentan. Bucknall also has new orders for XXX Corps: with a direct route along the coast blocked he is to take Bayeux as quickly as possible and then move to assist the Americans. All other British and Commonwealth units are to push south, but the objective is not specifically Caen: it is to cut the Caen-Bayeux road. 6th Airborne is to hang on until it can be reinforced but if necessary to fall back on the Bénouville bridge.
From the diary of Hauptmann Georg Müller, attached to Army Group B (with commentary)
A disturbed night. Enemy bombers and related alerts woke me a few times, but it was the sound of cars and vehicles screaming into and out of the Chateau[15] that were the real problem. As every messenger squealed to a halt I started to wonder what fresh disaster was about to be reported. Defeatist? Perhaps, but there was little to be positive about.
When I abandoned all thoughts of sleep, dressed, ate a decent breakfast and reported for duty, I found that my lack of confidence started to fade. Rommel[16] had arrived overnight and had spent some hours being briefed by von Rundstedt[17] before taking command of the situation. His enthusiasm and determination were contagious: the confusion and concerns of yesterday were swept aside. Add to that the cloudy skies hinting of worse weather to come, and things did not look so bad.
OKW was still dithering: Berlin apparently not convinced this was the major invasion we have been preparing for. I am not sure if they thought this was a diversion or a large raid, a sort of scaled up Dieppe[18]. There was no doubt at the Chateau, and von Rundstedt and Rommel used every trick they knew to get troops moving, even as OKW[19] refused to issue orders to release the units.
Wounded Canadians, a knocked out Churchill and burning landing craft: Dieppe was a costly but valuable learning experience for the Allies
In the light of day, things did not look as terrible as when, exhausted, I had collapsed in bed. While I tossed and turned, others had kept working. Phone, radio and telegraph messages had been made and received, recalcitrant officers harangued, supplies released. Under cover of darkness reinforcements had made good time moving north and west, and Rommel was starting to organise a co-ordinated defence. In fact, he was already talking of counter-attacks and driving the invaders back into the sea.
The situation on the Cotentin Peninsula has stabilised and the complete confusion that existed yesterday has largely disappeared. Cherbourg is secure for now, as Schlieben[20] has 709.ID placed to block any advance north. Valognes is no longer under threat and we have units from the Merderet to the flooded areas[21] south of Quineville. Although 243.ID is still struggling to get all its units into place, the vital road from Valognes to St-Sauveur-le-Vicomte is under our control: no parachutists have been reported that far west. The south is still a bit of a worry, mainly due to the apparent loss of the headquarters of 91.ID. Generalmajor Klosterkemper has set up a temporary headquarters at St Sauveur, and is co-ordinating the effort to break through to Picauville, where it is believed the headquarters is trapped. A few units of 91.ID, supported by a handful of tanks[22], is holding St-Côme-du-Mont north of the Douve River, blocking the road to Carentan.
Hotchkiss 38-H 734(f) tanks of PzBn 100 moving north to defend Carentan
The Cotentin Peninsula at daybreak on 7th June: the Germans have recovered quickly
Marcks[23] has taken direct control of these units until Klosterkemper can establish communications. With 30.Schnelle Brigade now north of St.Lo and moving quickly, everyone is a little more relaxed. I am still concerned though. No attacks were made during the night, it is the local commanders reluctant to commit to combat while the enemy have artillery while lack of an integrated command structure means we must do without. While we sit tight and bolster our defences, how many Americans are landing on the coast, far from our guns?
The US airborne divisions landed gliders carrying artillery support in the form of the M1AI 75mm Pack Howtizer, seen here during a training exercise.
West of Bayeux, Kraiß claims he has halted the invaders and is about to throw them back in the sea. Rommel is doubtful: I heard he fears that with daylight the enemy will again use their naval guns and airpower to push the odds in their favour. Nevertheless, for the moment that is the least pressing of our problems.
It is to the east of Bayeux that the real danger exists. Arromanches-les-Bains is still ours, but only few miles away a couple of battalions[24] are all that hold the British from crossing an estuary that represents our defence line. From there to the Canal de Caen, the coast is under enemy control.[25] There are still units north of the Seulles, but they are a mix of whatever could be scraped up, including some of the faster units of 21.PzD. During the night the British made several attacks and from what we can piece together in all cases our soldiers were forced back, often with significant losses.
The critical area for the defenders: Arromanches and the road to Omaha
Krug admits his division[26] has almost ceased to exist. He was able to reconstitute a battalion[27] from remnants of destroyed units, but that last reserve was committed overnight to halt a British advance from Lion-sur-Mer. The reality is that other than the lead units of 21.PzD, the defence of Caen is made up of isolated and largely unsupported groups of soldiers and artillery.
If those units can hold their positions for a few hours, we may be able to stiffen the defences. Reinforcements are on their way, and after travelling all night the closest, 346.ID, is only five or six kilometres east of Caen. When Diestel[28] gets the rest of his division across the Dives, Feuchtinger[29] can move the whole of his panzer division across the Orne to the north of Caen. In the meantime, he is clearing up the British paratroopers who have ventured too close to the Troarn-Caen road.
21.PzD should by enough to hold the British, at least until Hitlerjügend[30] arrives. Meyer assures Rommel his division will be in Caen by midday, as long as the bridges across the Dives and the Laizon remain intact. (Something we cannot guarantee: the Luftwaffe is impotent in the face of the thousands of Allied fighters. Rommel has ordered that key bridges be guarded by flak units, but they are scarce and what units are available have been pressed into assisting the infantry).
Bridges are not a major concern for another commander, Fritz von Bayerlein, but the lack of air cover is. He is bringing the 15,000 men of Panzer-Lehr-Division, perhaps the most powerful division in the west, from Paris and is acutely aware of the attractive target the division makes, its vehicles lined up along at least 10 kilometres of road. With luck they will be in Caen sometime late today, but how much damage will they suffer in transit?
A PzKpfw V “Panther” (with passengers) of Panzer-Lehr prepares to move up to Caen
Two other units are vulnerable to air attack as they move towards the coast, but neither 265.ID (which has been temporarily given enough transport vehicles to be effectively a motorised division) and 17.SS-ID are seen as priority targets. With luck they will make it to St Lo today without too much trouble.
But there is no more time to consider the situation: there is work to be done. Getting supplies to the troops fighting at the front will be critical, and it will not happen with me idly chatting to the night staff. Like everyone else, I must concentrate on my assigned task.
Commentary
The Allies used the night to land more troops and the German movement of reinforcements from the south and west increased markedly. There was little other activity . The paratroopers in contact with the enemy were not strong enough to launch unsupported attacks, and the one combat action at Omaha ended in failure. The British and Canadians made a series of small-scale attacks, all of which were successful, but little territory was gained.
Possibly the most significant event was the German advance under cover of night at Omaha. That encroachment on the landing could create real problems for the Americans.
The invasion still hangs in the balance, though as time goes on and more troops land the odds are swinging against the defenders, no matter how desperately they move fresh units to the invasion area.
Allied Losses (Night 7th June)
Airborne (US)
82nd Airborne Division: Nil
101st Airborne Division: Nil
Utah
4th infantry Divsion: Nil
Omaha
29th Inf Div: A/2/116/29
1st Inf Div: Nil
Gold
50th Inf Div: Nil
Juno
3rd Canadian Div: Nil
Sword
1SS: C/3RM
3rd Inf Div: Nil
Airborne (C’wlth)
6th Airborne Div: C/8/3
US Losses: 1 x INF
Commonwealth losses: 1 x COMM, 1 x PARA
Total Allied Losses: 1 x INF, 1 x COMM, 1 x PARA
German losses
Cotentin Peninsula
91.ID: Nil
709.ID: Nil
Omaha
352.ID: Nil
716.ID: Nil
Gold
716.ID: B/14.Pak/716
Strongpoints: (1)
Static Artillery: 6/AR 1716
Juno
716.ID: B/III/726/716
21.PzD: B/II/192/21.PzD
Strongpoints: (2)
Sword
716.ID: B/PzJag/716
East of Caen
21.PzD: Nil
German losses: 2 x INF, 2 x Anti-Tank, 2 x Strongpoints, 1 x Static Artillery
Cumulative Losses
Allied Losses
82nd Airborne: 3/505/82
10 PARA C/1/505, E/2/508, G & I/3/508, A & C/1/508, A/2/505
101st Airborne: 2/501/101
9 PARA B & C/1/501, H & I/3/501, H & I/3/506,
1st Inf Div: 2/16/1
6 INF A &B /2/18/1, B/3/16/1
4th Inf Div: A &B/1/8/4, A/3/8/4
3 INF
29th Inf Div: 1/116/29
8 INF A & B/3/116/29,A & C/2/116/29, A/1/115/29,
5th Rangers: A & B/5
2 COMM
Independent 743/V, 741/V
9 x ARM A/70/VII (DD)
A & B/745/V
6th Airborne: 8/3/6
8 PARA, 1 ARM A & B/1st Canadian/3, A & B/7/5, D/2nd O & B/5, AARR/6
3rd Inf Div: A & C/2EY/8/3, A/1SL/8/3, B/2EY/8/3
4 INF
50th Inf Div: A & B/1HR/231/50, A/6GH/231/50, A & C/5EY/69/50
6 INF A/7GH/69/50
3rd Canadian: A & B/7/3, A/QOR/8/3, C/NS/8/3, A/NNSH/9/3
5 INF A & B/RRR/7/3
4th Special Service Brigade: A/47RM/4SS, A/48RM/4SS, C/41RM/4SS
3 COMM
1st Special Service Brigade: B/4RM, C/3RM
2 COMM
Independent A/NY/8 (DD), A/4/8 (DD)
3 ARM 1RMASG
German losses
21.PzD: A/II/121/21Pz, A & B/II/192/21.PzD, A/200 PzJag/21.PzD,
4 INF, 1 ARM A/125/21.PzD
91.ID: 191/Pio/91, 14.PaK/91
6 INF, 2 AT A/111/1058/91, A/1/919/91, A/13.schw/91, 13/6FJ/9
352.ID: B & C/II/916/352, A/14.PaK/352, A/13.schw/352
3 INF, 1 AT
709.ID: B & C/1/919, A/795/739
3 INF
716.ID: II/726/716, I/736/716, 642/736/716 Ost, 14.PaK/716, PzJag/716
16 INF, 4 AT A & B/II/736/716, A & B/III/726/716, A/439/726/716 Ost, A/I/726/716, A/441/716/Ost, B/III/735/716,
Independent: A/II.1/III Flak, A/I.1/III Flak
2 Flak
Strongpoints: 6 x (4), 9 x (3), 5 x (2), 4 x (1)
24
Static Artillery: 1/AR 1716, 2/AR 1716, 3/AR 1716, 7/AR 1716, 1/HKAR 1261, 6/AR 191, 2/HKAA, 6/AR 1716
Notes
[1] Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force
[2] Admiral Alan Kirk, commander of Western task Force, on the heavy cruiser “Augusta” (CA-31)
[3] Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commander of 1st US Army
[4] Major General Leonard Gerow, commander of V Corps, responsible for Omaha beach
[5] Major General Charles Gerhardt, commander of 29th Infantry Division
[6] Colonel Charles Canham, commander of 116th Regiment, 29th Infantry Division. His regiment attacked a second-rate German unit (439 Ost Bataillon, 726 Grenadier Regiment, 716.D). The Ukranian volunteers were dug-in around the village and surrounding farmland. The better quality of the attackers was not enough to overcome the difficulties of a night assault, and the Americans were beaten back with about 100 casualties.
[7] Major General Lawton J Collins, commander of VII Corps, responsible for Utah beach
[8] Major General Maxwell Taylor, commander of 82nd Airborne Division
[9] Major General Matthew Ridgway, commander of 101st Airborne Division
[10] Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of 2nd British Army
[11] Major General Douglas Graham, commander of 50th Infantry Division
[12] Major General Richard Gale, commander of 6th Airborne Division
[13] “C” company, 8th (Midland Counties) Parachute Battalion, 3rd Parachute Brigade, commanded by Major G Hewetson. The village was attacked by Panzer Regiment 125, 21.PzD, commanded by Major von Luck, supported by Panzer Pionere Abt 220, commanded by Major Hoegl. The Americans were surrounded, outnumbered and the buildings in which they took cover were no help against the flamethrowers of the German engineers. After sustaining heavy losses, Major Hewetson was forced to order his remaining men to surrender.
[14] Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force.
[15] The Chateau of La Roche Guyon, headquarters of Army Group B, 50 kilometres northwest of Paris on the Seine River
[16] Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, commander of Heeresgruppe B
[17] Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Oberbefehlshaber West
[18] On 19th August 1942, a mainly Canadian force attempted to seize the port of Dieppe in Normandy. It was intended to be a raid, to destroy port facilities, gain intelligence and then evacuate. After just 5 hours, when it was clear that the invaders were trapped on the beach, the operation was called off. Of the 6,000 men who landed, more than half were lost. While a debacle, the Allies learned a lot from the mistakes made
[19] Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, led by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel. Effectively it had overall command of all units other than those on the East Front.
[20] Generalmajor Wilhelm von Schlieben, commander of 709.ID
[21] The Germans had deliberately flooded large areas of farmland just behind the coast, with only a few causeways allowing exit from the beaches.
[22] Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 100 equipped with about 30 converted French tanks, mainly the Panzer 35-R(f) and 38-H 734(f).
[23] General der Artillerie Erich Marcks, commander of LXXXIV Armeekorps
[24] One battalion from 916.Grenadier-Regiment, 352.ID and one battalion from 726.Grenadier-Regiment, 716.ID
[25] Unknown to the German command, Ouistreham and Riva Bella were still held by some coastal artillery troops and a field battery from 716.ID.
[26] Generalmajor Krug, 716.ID
[27] I/736/716
[28] Generalmajor Erich Diestel
[29] Generalleutnat Edgar Feuchtinger, 21.PzD
[30] 12.SS-Panzer-Divsion “Hitlerjügend”, commander SS-Obersturmbannführer Kurt Meyer
Invasion 44: A GMT "The Battle for Normandy" AAR 